

Message Text

SECRET

PAGE 01 SALT T 00139 01 OF 02 032019 Z

42

ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 CCO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 DODE-00 CIAE-00

INRE-00 /026 W

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O P 031857 Z APR 73

FM USDEL SALT TWO II

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1918

INFO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY

USMISSION NATO PRIORITY

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 USDEL SALT TWO II 0139

EXDIS SALT

DOD HANDLE AS SPECAT FOR SECDEF

E. O. 11652 XGDSI

TAGS: PARM

SUBJECT: SEMENOV STATEMENT, APRIL 3, 1973

FOLLOWING IS THE TRANSLATION OF THE STATEMENT
PRESENTED BY MINISTER SEMENOV, TUESDAY, APRIL 3, 1973.

SEMENOV STATEMENT, APRIL 3, 1973

OVER A PERIOD OF THREE WEEKS THE USSR DELEGATION,
GUIDED BY THE DESIRE TO CONTRIBUTE TO PROGRESS AT THE NEGOTIA-
TIONS, HAS BEEN SYSTEMATICALLY SETTING FORTH PROPOSALS OF THE
SOVIET SIDE WITH RESPECT TO WORKING OUT AN UNDERSTANDING ON
MORE COMPLETE MEASURES TO LIMIT STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS.
WE HAVE INTRODUCED A NUMBER OF CONCRETE AND CONSTRUCTIVE
PROPOSALS AIMED AT REACHING SUCH AN UNDERSTANDING.

ON THE PART OF THE U. S. DELEGATION WE OBSERVED A CLEAR
PREFERENCE NOT FOR DISCUSSION OF CONCRETE SOLUTIONS TO THE
ARRAY OF COMPLEX PROBLEMS BEFORE US, BUT RATHER FOR INTRODUC-
TION OF NEW " CRITERIA" AND " KEY ELEMENTS" WHICH RESULT IN A
ONE- SIDED APPROACH TO ASSESSMENT OF THE STRATEGIC SITUATION
AND DO NOT TAKE INTO ACCOUNT A NUMBER OF MOST IMPORTANT
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PAGE 02 SALT T 00139 01 OF 02 032019 Z

FACTORS BEARING ON IT. IT MAY VERY WELL BE THAT THESE CONCEPTS DO HAVE A CERTAIN PHILOSOPHICAL MEANING, BUT THEIR DISCUSSION WOULD NOT MOVE US CLOSER TO THE SOLUTION OF THE PROBLEMS BEFORE US.

WE BELIEVE THAT IN THIS HALL THERE IS A MUTUAL DESIRE TO SEARCH FOR WAYS TOWARDS MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE AND MUTUALLY ADVANCED TO VISIT APRIL 5 THE DIRECTOR OF THE POST GRADUATE HISTORY DEPARTMENT TO DISCUSS POSSIBILITIES OF COOPERATION.

4. ADDRESS AT ACADEMY OF HISTORY WAS VERY DIGNIFIED AND IMPRESSIVE. MEMBERS OF ACADEMY ASKED DR. FRANKLIN WHETHER THEY COULD TRANSLATE AND PUBLISH HIS SPEECH "HISTORIANS AND PUBLIC POLICY" IN THEIR JOURNAL. BASTIAN

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PAGE 01 SALT T 00139 02 OF 02 032112 Z

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ACTION SS-25

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S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 2 USDEL SALT TWO II 0139

EXDIS SALT

DOD HANDLE AS SPECAT FOR SECDEF

AN UNDERSTANDING ON MORE COMPLETE MEASURES TO LIMIT STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS MUST PROVIDE FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF QUANTITATIVE AND QUALITATIVE LIMITATIONS ON LAND- BASED ICBM LAUNCHERS, SLBM LAUNCHERS AND THE SUBMARINES THEMSELVES.

COMMENTS TO THE EFFECT THAT SUPPOSEDLY THE SOVIET SIDE SOMEHOW LEAVES THESE TYPES OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE WEAPONS TO ONE SIDE OR IN THE SHADOW, ARE DEVOID OF FOUNDATION. IN ACTUAL FACT WE HAVE MORE THAN ONCE STRESSED THE GREAT IMPORTANCE OF LIMITATIONS ON THESE SYSTEMS. THESE LIMITATIONS SHOULD BE ESTABLISHED ON THE BASIS OF EXISTING AGREEMENTS, KEEPING IN MIND THE COINCIDING VIEW OF THE SIDES THAT THESE AGREEMENTS ARE A MAJOR STEP TOWARD CURBING AND IN THE END HALTING THE ARMS RACE. IN NEGOTIATING THEM THE SIDES COMPREHENSIVELY CONSIDERED AND AGREED ON MANY QUESTIONS OF PRINCIPLE, TOOK INTO ACCOUNT CERTAIN ASYMMETRIES AND TO A CERTAIN DEGREE OTHER COMPLEX ASPECTS OF A POLITICAL AND MILITARY- TECHNOLOGICAL NATURE AS WELL. THE AGREEMENT ACHIEVED WAS APPROVED BY THE HIGHEST GOVERNMENTAL BODIES OF OUR STATES AND BY OUR PEOPLES. IT CONSTITUTES A BASIS FOR THE SEARCH FOR FURTHER MORE COMPLETE MEASURES WITH RESPECT TO THE LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS.

AN UNDERSTANDING ON MORE COMPLETE MEASURES MUST ALSO
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 SALT T 00139 02 OF 02 032112 Z

PROVIDE FOR ESTABLISHING AGREED LIMITATIONS UP: JELISARJEV ACKNOWLEDGED, WITHOUT PROMPTING, THAT WEST NOT PREPARED TO ADDRESS FOLLOW- UP QUESTION IN DEPTH UNTIL LATE IN CSCE COMMITTEE PHASE. HE RECOGNIZED THIS AS " TACTICAL POSITION -- YOU ARE NOT PREPARED TO GIVE US THIS ISSUE UNTIL LATER". EMOBOFF RECALLED THAT WEST HAD NOT YET AGREED TO CONVENE MINISTERIAL AND THAT COMMISSION STAGE ALSO WOULD INVOLVE DIFFICULT NEGOTIATIONS. WHILE THE US AND ITS ALLIES WERE AIMING FOR THE HOPEFUL CONCERNING JUNE TARGET DATE, PRESENT MOMENT WAS PREMATURE FOR BUSINESSLIKE CONSIDERATION OF POSSIBLE POST- CSCE ACTIVITIES. CONCRETE RESULTS OF MPT, MINISTERIAL AND COMMITTEE PHASES COULD PROVIDE GOOD BASIS FOR SERIOUS CONSIDERATION OF CSCE FOLLOW- UP ISSUE. JELISARJEV INDICATED THAT USSR HAD NO MAJOR PROBLEM WITH THIS APPROACH. HE MADE PITCH AT THIS POINT FOR SUMMIT LEVEL CSCE THIRD PHASE, ARGUING THAT CSCE WOULD REPRESENT " NEW DEVELOPMENT" IN RELATIONS IN EUROPE. EMOBOFF REPLIED THAT US ALSO HOPED THAT CSCE WOULD CONTRIBUTE TO BETTER RELATIONS AMONG PARTICIPATING STATES BUT SAW EAST/ WEST PROCESS AS CONTINUOUS AND DYNAMIC ONE RATHER THAN SUDDEN DRAMATIC OPENING OF NEW BOOK.

7 ANTI- AMERICANISM IN FRG: JELISARJEV QUERIED EMOBOFF ABOUT REPORTS OF " ANTI- AMERICANISM" IN FRG, SAYING HE HAD IMPRESSION THAT THIS PHENOMENON HAD

BROADER HOLD THAN SIMPLY AMONG JUSOS. HE ALSO ASKED ABOUT
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 BONN 04899 02 OF 02 032127 Z

PROSPECTS FOR NEW OFFSET AGREEMENT. EMBOFF REPLIED THAT THERE ALWAYS HAD BEEN RATHER SMALL WING OF SPD THAT TOOK EXTREME LINE BUT THAT GERMAN GOVERNMENT AND CITIZENRY HAD AND WOULD CONTINUE TO COOPERATE CLOSELY WITH USG IN NATO AND OTHER FORA, AS PROVEN BY REPEATED POLLS AND EXPERIENCE. EMBOFF SAID US AND FRG WOULD AS IN THE PAST FIND MUTUALLY SATISFACTORY OFFSET AGREEMENT. EMBOFF THEN ASKED JELISARJEV TO COMMENT ON HIS OWN QUESTIONS. SOVIET REP'S REPLY INDICATED SOME CONCERN THAT EUROPEAN UNION COULD AT FUTURE POINT COME ALSO TO INCLUDE A KIND OF EUROPEAN DEFENSE COMMUNITY IN WHICH GERMANS PLAYED LEADING ROLE AND HAD ACCESS TO NUCLEAR WEAPONS. WHILE THIS OBVIOUSLY WAS NOT A CURRENT PROBLEM IN THE SOVIET VIEW, JELISARJEV SAID THE SOVIETS HAD READ WITH INTEREST AND CURIOSITY THE WELT STORY CONCERNING REPORTED FOUR STEP PLAN OF EGON BAHR WHICH WOULD RESULT IN THE DISSOLUTION OF THE NATO ALLIANCE (BONN 4809).

8. MBFR: HUNGARIAN PARTICIPATION. JELISARJEV AND EMBOFF HAD TOUGH EXCHANGE ON THIS ISSUE, WITH NEITHER SIDE MOVING BEYOND POSITIONS PRESENTED IN VIENNA MIT. JELISARJEV PLAYED " HUNGARY OUT OR ITALY IN" RECORD; EMBOFF RECALLED SOVIET ACCEPTANCE OF NOV 15 WESTERN NOTE, WHICH HAD ITALY IN CONSULTATIVE STATUS. JELISARJEV SAID: " THAT LEAVES US IN A STATEMATE; SO WHAT DO WE DO NEXT". EMBOFF REPLIED THAT NEUTRAL FORMULA MUST BE FOUND THAT WOULD NOT PREJUDICE SUBSTANTIVE ISSUE EITHER WAY AND THAT MEANT THAT HUNGARIAN ISSUE MUST BE LEFT IN ABEYANCE. EMBOFF ADDED THAT WESTERN COUNTRIES FOUND IT INCREASINGLY DIFFICULT TO UNDERSTAND PERSISTING RUSSIAN INFLEXIBILITY ON THIS MATTER. HILLENBRAND

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